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FEDERAL COURTS-THREE JUDGES OR ONE? A
PROBLEM OF OVERLAPPING POWER IN THE
DISTRICT COURTS
Murrow v. Clifford'
Certain sensitive areas of federal litigation are required by
various acts of Congress to be heard and determined by district
courts composed of three judges.! Congress has also provided for
direct appeal from the decisions of these courts to the Supreme
Court as a matter of right.' This procedure has recently become
the focus of continuing efforts to streamline the federal judicial
system.' For example section 2281 of Title 281 requires a threejudge court whenever a litigant seeks to enjoin the enforcement
of a state statute on the ground that the statute violates the
federal Constitution.' One problem with this statute concerns the
necessity of convening a three-judge court when a litigant seeks
to enjoin the enforcement of a state statute on both constitutional
and nonconstitutional grounds. Breaking with tradition, the Supreme Court, in Hagans v. Lavine,7 held it proper for a single
district judge to grant an injunction on nonconstitutional grounds
without initially convening a three-judge court. In finding such a
procedure preferable, the Court attempted to settle one aspect of
the procedural maze endemic to the area of three-judge court
law.' Despite Hagans' apparently clear direction, the recent
1. 502 F.2d 1066 (3d Cir. 1974).
2. The various statutes requiring three-judge courts are compiled in a Cross Reference to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2284 (1965), and addendum, (Supp. 1975). The procedures to be
followed in convening and operating the courts are controlled by 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1970),
as amended, (Supp. II, 1972).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970) provides:
Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to the Supreme Court
from an order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory or
permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding required by an Act of
Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges.
4. See, e.g., W. BURGER, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE STATE OF THE JuDici~aY 7 (Feb. 23,
1975).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970) provides:
An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or
execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer of such State
in the enforcement or execution of such statute or of an order made by an administrative board or commission acting under State statutes, shall not be granted by
any district court or judge thereof upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of
such statute unless the application therefor is heard and determined by a district
court of three judges under section 2284 of this title.
6. See text accompanying notes 24-29 infra.
7. 415 U.S. 528 (1974).
8. For the Supreme Court's most recent criticism of this complex area of statutory
law see Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 95 S. Ct. 289 (1974), discussed
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Third Circuit case of Murrow v. Clifford illustrates the continuing
inability of the courts to solve the complexities arising from the
"opaque terms and prolix syntax"9 of the statutory law with respect to three-judge courts.
In Murrow the plaintiff brought an action in the United
States District Court in New Jersey seeking an injunction against
the enforcement of a state welfare regulation,' 0 claiming that the
regulation was discriminatory and that it deprived her of the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Constitution.I' She
also claimed that the state regulation conflicted with the Social
Security Act," and was void by operation of the supremacy
clause. "
in this note in the text accompanying notes 49-59 infra. The Court is not alone in criticising the statute. See, e.g., The Judicial Conference of the United States, Reports of the
Proceedingsof the JudicialConference of the United States 78 (October 1970); Currie, The
Three-Judge Federal District Court in ConstitutionalLitigation, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 1
(1964). The Senate actually passed a bill which would have eliminated the requirement
of three-judge courts in actions to enjoin the enforcement of state or federal statutes on
grounds of unconstitutionality. S. 271, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), passed by voice vote,
119 CONG. REc. S11114 (daily ed. June 14, 1973), but the House of Representatives never
reported it out of committee. See Status of Senate Bills, 1 CCH CONGRESSIONAL INDEX 93RD
CONGRESS 1973-1974, at 2501, 2504; Current Status of Senate Bills, id. at 2453.
9. Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 95 S. Ct. 289, 297 (1974).
10. The state regulation denied AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children)
benefits to unborn children. AFDC is a welfare program created by the Social Security
Act §§ 401-10, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-10 (1970), as amended, (Supp. 1, 1972). Funding is
provided by the federal government, but the administration of the program is left to the
individual states. New Jersey's participation is authorized by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-31
(1964), and is handled by the New Jersey State Department of Institutions and Agencies,
the Commissioner of which was the defendant in this action. HEW, which is charged with
the administration of the federal end of the program, interprets the Social Security Act
as allowing benefits to unborn children, 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(c)(2)(ii)(1973), but considers
the matter to be optional with the states. New Jersey chose to deny the benefits in the
regulation challenged in the subject case.
11. Plaintiffs claim was that no rational basis existed for discriminating between
pregnant mothers and their unborn children, and all other mothers and their children.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 601-10 (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972)._
13. The conflict, plaintiff argued, involved the optional nature of HEW's policy
allowing but not requiring the state to aid unborn children. The problem with affording
states this option is that 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) requires that if states participate at all,
they must extend benefits "to all eligible individuals." Since HEW regards unborn children as within the Social Security Act's definition of "dependent child," 42 U.S.C. §
606(a), the theory was that unborn children were "eligible individuals" and that New
Jersey's denial of benefits conflicted with § 602 (a)(10) and was therefore void. As of
January 31, 1973, some thirty-four states, territories or United States possessions had
chosen not to extend eligibility to the unborn, Maryland being one of the minority which

had extended the benefits. HEW

CMRACTERISTICS OF STATE PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PLANS
UNDER THE SoCIAL SEcUrrY ACT (1973). At least three courts of appeals have held that

regulations denying benefits to unborn children conflict with the Social Security Act. Doe
v. Lukhard, 493 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3699 (U.S.,
May 24, 1974); Wilson v. Weaver, 499 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1974); Alcala v. Burns, 494 F.2d
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The district court, sitting as a single judge, found federal
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) & (4).4 On the merits, the
court denied the injunction, holding for the state on both the
constitutional and the statutory claims. On appeal, the Third
Circuit found federal jurisdiction over the constitutional claim
under § 1343(3), however, regarding the statutory claim, it found
federal power not in the statute, but in the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction." With respect to the constitutional claim, the court
held that the single judge lacked power to deny an injunction
since 28 U.S.C. § 228116 requires that such a claim be heard and
determined by a three-judge court. Consequently, it vacated the
judgment insofar as it denied this claim and remanded it to the
743 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3208 (U.S., Oct. 15, 1974). But see, e.g.,
Mixon v. Keller, 372 F. Supp. 51 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
[After this Note went to press, the Supreme Court decided Bums v. Alcala,
43 U.S.L.W. 4374 (U.S. Mar. 18, 1975). The Court held that an unborn child was
not within the meaning of the statutory term "dependent child," and therefore that
states could not be forced to pay benefits to pregnant mothers for their unborn
children. The Court left open the question whether HEW had authority, under the
law, to provide states the option of extending the benefits to unborn children,
implying that it is possible that those state AFDC programs, such as the one in
Maryland, which have allowed the benefits, may not be authorized by law.]
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by
law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by
the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal
rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States;
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act
of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote.
Specifically the district judge found jurisdiction under (3) as to the constitutional claim
and under (4) as to the statutory supremacy clause claim. Whether there is independent
federal jurisdiction over such statutory claims, either under (4) or (3), is an unsettled
issue. For a discussion of the problems involved see Note, FederalJurisdictionover Challenges to State Welfare Programs, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1972). The Supreme Court
discusses the problem in Hagans, 415 U.S. at 533-35 n.5. A recent decision in the fourth
circuit reached the conclusion that § 1343(3) jurisdiction is coextensive in scope with the
causes of action created by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), which would include such statutory
claims. Blue v. Craig, 505 F.2d 830 (4th Cir. 1974).
15. Where a plaintiff has two claims only one of which comes under federal jurisdiction, a federal court has discretion to try the other claim when "[tihe state and federal
claims . . . derive from a common nucleus of operative fact" and "if, considered without
regard to their federal and state character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he would
ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding . . . ." United Mine
Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). The doctrine has been held to be
particularly applicable when the pendent claim is one of federal law instead of state law.
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 545-50 (1974).
16. See note 5 supra.
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district court to hear as a three-judge court. Turning to the judgment on the statutory claim, the court considered it an interlocutory order denying an injunction and thus held that it had appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).17 Purporting to rely
on Haganss the court held that it was improper for the single
judge to deny the plaintiff's statutory claim. The court of appeals
read Hagans as standing for the proposition that the single judge
could decide the statutory claim only if the decision would be for
the plaintiff, thereby terminating the trial.
THE PRIOR LAW

The effect and merits of this decision are perhaps better
understood in the context of the prior developments in this area.
When the Supreme Court, in Ex parte Young,"5 recognized the
17. This holding was asserted without authority by the majority. 502 F.2d at 1069.
Judge Rosenn who dissented from the majority decision in Murrow concurred on this
point, noting that it was not without its difficulties. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1970) provides:
(a) The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:
(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts . . . or of the judge thereof, granting,
continuing, modifying, refusing, or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify
injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court ....
The problem as Judge Rosenn saw it was:
whether a district court's ruling on one of several legal grounds asserted in support
of a single claim for which injunctive relief is sought constitutes an interlocutory
denial of an injunction within § 1292(a)(1).
502 F.2d at 1071 n.4. United States v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 276 F.2d 525 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 961, 964 (1960), was cited as basic source material in support of the
finding of jurisdiction. There the government alleged that an agreement between defendant and a banking group was invalid, sought a declaratory judgment to that effect, and
an injunction to prevent the defendants from carrying the agreement out. There were
several grounds for the government's attack. The court denied the government's motion
for summary judgment and dismissed one of these grounds entirely. Judge Friendly,
writing for the court, held that an appeal from such an order was authorized by section
1292(a)(1). However, the Second Circuit purported to overrule this decision in Chappell
& Co. v. Frankel, 367 F.2d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 1966) (denial of plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment, on ground there was a genuine issue of fact, Feld not to be appealable). Since
the facts of the two cases are distinguishable in that the former was a denial on the merits
while the latter was not, it is probable that the rule of the former is still valid within the
Second Circuit. See Western Geophysical Co. v. Bolt Associates, Inc., 440 F.2d 765, 77071 n.4 (2d Cir. 1971); Build of Buffalo, Inc. v. Sedita, 441 F.2d 284, 291-95 (2d Cir. 1971)
(dissenting opinion); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 461 F.2d 1040,
1043-44 (2d Cir. 1972) (concurring opinion).
As Judge Rosenn points out in his dissent, allowing interlocutory review in Murrow
makes it possible for there to be a reduction in the number of "forced" constitutional
decisions by the three-judge court, since if the circuit court reverses the single judge's
denial, it will be remanded for him to grant the injunction, and the constitutional grounds
will never have to be reached.
18. 415 U.S. 528 (1974).
19. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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power of a federal court to enjoin a state official from enforcing a
state statute, there was considerable political reaction, culminating in the passage of the predecessor of section 2281.0 The purpose of that provision was to provide "procedural protection
against statewide doom by a federal court of a state's legislative
policy." 2 ' The supposition was that three judges would be more
careful, less likely to err or to act for corrupt purposes, and more
likely to command the respect and gain the compliance of state
officials. 22 This purpose was largely obviated by the revision of the
Federal Equity Rules which provided lesser, but substantial, procedural protection against all federal injunctions. 23 Since the procedure is burdensome on the federal judicial system, the courts
have strictly limited the application of section 2281.4 For example, a three-judge court is required only if the relief sought is
injunctive; a declaratory judgment, though it may serve the same
purpose, should be sought from a single judge. 2 Furthermore, the
statute challenged must be of statewide applicability, 2 and the
party sought to be enjoined must be a state officer.2 Finally, the
basis of the challenge to the statute must be of constitutional
magnitude.28 Claims are not deemed "constitutional" in this
20. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 266, 36 Stat. 1162.
21. Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 251 (1941).
22. See Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 95 S. Ct. 289, 294 n.5
(1974); Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246 (1941); 45 CONG. Rc. 7256 (1910) (remarks
of Senator Overman). For a very thorough analysis of the policy and the history of the
statute see Currie, The Three-JudgeDistrict Court in ConstitutionalLitigation,32 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1 (1964).
23. Equity R. 73, 198 Fed. xxxiv (1912). This rule required notice to be given to the
enjoined party whenever a preliminary injunction was issued, and in the case of a temporary restraining order, required notice unless the moving party could clearly show from
specific facts that he would suffer immediate and irreparable harm before notice could
be served. It also placed a ten day limit on such an ex parte order, and provided for the
highest priority to be afforded to the hearing on its return. These provisions exist today
in substantially the same form in Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See
Comment, The Three-Judge Federal Court in Constitutional Litigation: A Procedural
Anachronism, 27 U. CHn. L. Rxv. 555 (1960).
24. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Donovan, 398 U.S. 427 (1970); Swift & Co. v. Wickham,
382 U.S. 111 (1965); Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246 (1941).
25. Mitchell v. Donovan, 398 U.S. 427 (1970). See also, Note, FederalCourts Jurisdiction: The Supreme Court Lacks Jurisdictionto Considera DirectAppeal from a ThreeJudge District Court Order Grantingor Denying a DeclaratoryJudgment That a Federal
Statute is Unconstitutional,49 TEXAs L. REv. 155 (1970).
26. Board of Regents v. New Left Educ. Project, 404 U.S. 541 (1972) (rules governing
only a portion of a state's higher education system do not have statewide application or
effectuate a statewide policy).
27. Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97 (1967) (members of a county board of supervisors
are not state officials).
28. Ex parte Bransford, 310 U.S. 354 (1940) (mere allegation that statute had been
misconstrued, resulting in an unconstitutional tax, was not a constitutional challenge).
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sense if merely based on the theory that the state statute conflicts
with a federal law and is therefore void because of the supremacy
clause. 9
More pertinent to the discussion of the instant case, courts
have limited the use of the larger panel by expanding the power
of the single judge over cases which might appear to be within the
purview of the statute. In Ex parte Poresky, 0 the Supreme Court
recognized the single judge's power to make a threshold determination of the substantiality of the constitutional claim for the
purpose of determining federal jurisdiction. Thus if the judge
found that the claim was insubstantial, he could dismiss the action without convening a three-judge court. In Bailey v.
Patterson,31 the Court also allowed the converse power to the
single judge: he could enjoin the enforcement of a state statute
when the state's claim that the statute was not unconstitutional
was clearly frivolous due to earlier Supreme Court adjudications
of the same issue. More recently, it was stated in Rosado v.
Wyman3 21 that the three-judge court could remand any nonconstitutional claims to the single judge for his determination.
29. Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 (1965). Although the language of section
2281 may appear to prohibit an injunction based on the operation of the supremacy clause
as positively as one based on the equal protection clause, the Supreme Court held that
"Supremacy Clause cases are not within the purview of § 2281." Id. at 122. The justification for the distinction is that supremacy clause cases merely involve the interpretation
and application of federal statutes as opposed to "reading meaning into the generalities
of the substantive provisions of the Constitution." A.L.I., STUDY OF THE DMSION OF JUtusDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL CoumRS 322 (1969).
30. 290 U.S. 30 (1933). In Poresky, the Supreme Court refused to allow an application for mandamus compelling a single judge to convene a three-judge court. Plaintiff had
sought to enjoin Massachusetts state officers from enforcing a state law requiring automobile insurance. In denying mandamus, the Court stated that "in the absence of diversity
of citizenship it is essential that a substantial federal question be presented," and whether
a substantial federal question is presented is within the power of the single judge to
determine. A "question may be plainly insubstantial either because it is 'obviously with-'
out merit' or because 'its unsoundness so clearly results from the previous decisions of this
court as to foreclose the inference that the question sought to be raised can be the subject
of a controversy.' "Id. at 31-32 (citations omitted). Thus, if a claim of unconstitutionality
is plainly insubstantial the single judge may dismiss the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
31. 369 U.S. 31 (1962). In Bailey, black plaintiffs sought to enjoin Mississippi state
enforcement of a statute requiring segregation in transportation facilities. The Supreme
Court had earlier held several such statutes to be unconstitutional. E.g., Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946). The three-judge court abstained pending state court action.
On appeal, the Supreme Court remanded to the single judge for enforcement of plaintiffs'
rights and stated that a three-judge court was unnecessary where the question of the
constitutionality of a statute was "no longer open," "wholly insubstantial," or "essentially
fictitious." 396 U.S. at 33.
32. 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
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Hagans continued this expansion of the power of the single
judge. The district judge had granted an injunction on the basis
of the statutory claim without convening a three-judge court. The
Court held that "[s]ection 2281 does not forbid this practice. . .

"
.

It recognized that this procedure might "appear at

odds" with older law, 3 but thought that it was more attuned to
the development of three-judge court law, the efficient operation
of the lower federal courts, and the Court's constrictive view of
the statute. 3 The Court did not hold, however, that it would be
improper for the three-judge court to be convened initially and
for it to hear the entire case. Since this latter procedure was
standard in the past and was not overruled, it would appear that
a district court can choose between proceeding as a single judge
to the nonconstitutional issues, or initially convening a threejudge court. As a matter of efficiency, it is clear that using three
judges is more wasteful than using one,3" and therefore that, absent other considerations, the single judge should always handle
everything short of the constitutional claim before convening a
three-judge court.37
33. 415 U.S. at 545.
34. Id. at 543. The Court cited Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Chicago, R.I.
& P.R.R., 382 U.S. 423 (1966); and Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S.
73 (1960). In the latter, the Court had stated:
[W]hen, in any action to enjoin enforcement of a state statute, the injunctive
decree may issue on the ground of federal unconstitutionality of the state statute,
the convening of a three-judge court is necessary; and the joining in the complaint
of a non-constitutional attack along with the constitutional one does not dispense
with the necessity to convene such a court.
Id. at 80.
Doubt was cast on the continuing validity of this in Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397
(1970), where the Court stated that a three-judge court could remand any nonconstituttonal issues to the single judge for his determination. Indeed, several district courts read
Rosado broadly to allow initial determination of statutory claims without a three-judge
court before Hagans specifically sanctioned that procedure. E.g., Norton v. Richardson,
352 F. Supp. 596 (D. Md. 1972).
35. 415 U.S. at 544.
36. This inefficiency is especially apparent when it is considered that there may not
even be independent federal jurisdiction over the statutory claim since it will not usually
meet the $10,000 amount in controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). See note
14 supra. If Congress may have denied any federal forum to such a claim if brought by
itself, it would seem anomalous to require a three-judge court for the claim, just because
it is pendent to a constitutional claim. This anomaly is magnified by Hagans, which
recognized pendent jurisdiction even though the constitutional claim was weak and the
statutory claim made up the plaintiffs primary case.
37. In Doe v. Lukhard, 493 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 42
U.S.L.W. 3699 (U.S., May 24, 1974), the Fourth Circuit stated that it would be more
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The question unanswered by Hagans is whether there might
be competing considerations which would make the single judge
procedure undesirable. Murrow appears to be the first case decided after Hagans which addresses this question. The Murrow
court finds such a consideration in the often stated doctrine that
nonconstitutional grounds for disposition are to be exhausted before a constitutional decision is reached.3" Hagans, the court
noted, also stood for this rule. Therefore, the court reasoned that
where the single judge granted the plaintiff's statutory claim, as
in Hagans, the constitutional decision became unnecessary, as
did the three-judge court; but, where the single judge denied the
statutory claim, as in Murrow, then the only ground left for decision would be the constitutional issue, which would have to be
heard by a court of three judges. Moreover, the three-judge court
would be precluded by the single judge's decision from deciding
the case on anything other than the constitutional grounds.3 9 In
those cases where the other two judges on the court would have
efficient to initially convene a three-judge court, since if the single judge denied the
statutory claim, the three-judge court, which would then have to be convened, might
disagree with the single judge's ruling, but, being powerless to correct it, would be forced
to decide the constitutional issue. Such an unnecessary decision, the court felt, was inefficient. In addition, Judge Winter, writing for the court, saw inefficiency in the fact that
appeal from this unnecessary decision would be to the Supreme Court. The court recommended that a three-judge court always be initially convened so that it could look out for
this problem, and only remand statutory issues to the single judge in accordance with
Rosado when it saw little chance of such a result. Admittedly, it is difficult to assess
relative efficiencies absent complete statistics, especially where the comparison is between
efficiency in the district court and in the Supreme Court's docket, but given the
"[Supreme] Court's concern for efficient operation of the lower federal courts," and its
statement that "'it would be grossly inefficient to send a three-judge court a claim which
will only be sent immediately back,' " 415 U.S. at 544, quoting Norton v. Richardson, 352
F. Supp. 596, 599 (D. Md. 1972), the fourth circuit's concern appears to be unwarranted.
Doe was decided shortly before Hagans, which may explain its position. However, the
third circuit in Murrow relied on Doe's reasoning in its opinion, 502 F.2d at 1070, apparently not considering Doe to have been overruled. The District Court of Maryland, however, in Bethea v. Mason, Civil No. 73-874H (D. Md. Dec. 12, 1974) (notice of appeal by
defendant, Jan. 6, 1975), followed Hagans without mentioning the Doe decision.
38. This is the so-called "Ashwander Principle." Originating in the case of Siler v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909), it received its most famous formulation
in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Justice Brandeis, concurring). The Supreme Court in Hagans discussed the doctrine thoroughly, 415 U.S. at 546-47, & 547 n.12,
and concluded that:
The doctrine is not ironclad, but it is recurringly applied, and, at the very least, it
presumes the advisability of deciding first the pendant non-constitutional issue.
415 U.S. 546-47 (citations omitted). But see, Francis v. Davidson, 340 F. Supp. 351 (D.
Md.), aff'd, 409 U.S. 904 (1972), where a three-judge court denied the constitutional
claims before granting an injunction based on the statutory claim.
39. 502 F.2d at 1070. The court also stated its belief that the Supreme Court would
be deprived of an opportunity to decide the statutory claim on appeal. See note 42 infra.
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disagreed with the single judge's disposition of the statutory
claim, there would be a needless constitutional decision. Since
this would contravene the doctrine preferring nonconstitutional
decisions, the court held that it was improper for the single judge
to decide the statutory claim against the plaintiff. Hagans was
read narrowly to approve the single judge's decision on a statutory claim only if that decision were favorable to the plaintiff,
thereby making a constitutional adjudication unnecessary. Thus,
the Murrow court takes the position that the single judgeshould
refrain from entering an order denying plaintiff relief on the
statutory ground. Rather, if the single judge is prepared to find
for defendant on this claim, a three-judge court should be convened to determine the statutory as well as the constitutional
claims.
ANALYSIS

Judge Rosenn dissented from the court's resolution of this
issue, 0 pointing out that Hagans clearly contemplated the possibility of the single judge's decision being against the state.4 The
majority's rule, therefore, appeared to be inconsistent with a very
recent opinion of the Supreme Court. Moreover, he argued that
the majority's view would discourage all action by the single
judge because, if, after taking evidence, the single judge found the
statutory ground not to be dispositive, a three-judge court would
have to be convened to duplicate the work already done by the
single judge. Faced with this wasteful possibility, Judge Rosenn
argued, the district judge would instead always initially convene
a three-judge court. In other words, the majority's rule, while
purporting only to restrain the single judge in situations which
could be distinguished from the situation in Hagans, actually
would restrain the single judge in other situations, including the
42
one in Hagans
40. 502 F.2d 1066, 1070 (dissenting opinion).
41. 502 F.2d at 1072. The language relied upon was this:
[tihe latter [the statutory-claim] was to be decided first and the former not
reached if the statutory claim was dispositive . . . . It is true that the constitutional claim would warrant convening a three-judge court and that if a singlejudge
rejects the statutory claim, a three-judge court must be called to consider the
constitutional issue.
502 F.2d at 1071 (emphasis supplied by Judge Rosenn), quoting from Hagans, 415 U.S.
at 543-44.
42. Judge Rosenn also questioned the majority's assertion that the Supreme Court
would be unable to review a single judge's decision on the statutory claim. No authority
was cited on either side of the question, although the dissent demonstrated that the
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The majority's concern about "forced" constitutional decisions, if the single judge denies the plaintiff relief on the statutory
ground before convening a three-judge court, is based on a misconception of the proper application of the doctrine preferring
nonconstitutional decisions. The misconception is contained in
the Murrow court's view of the three-judge court's role in the
trial. This view is revealed in the court's discussion:
Any rule which has the effect of requiring the decision of a
constitutional issue in order to terminate a lawsuit, without
affording the tribunal making the final decision an opportunity to reach a preferred statutory supremacy clause
ground and thereby possibly avoid the constitutional issue,
is inconsistent with the policy laid down in Hagans. .... 43
The court thus regards the three-judge court as the tribunal to
apply the doctrine of avoiding constitutional decisions. The tribunal to be considered, however, is the district court itself, not
the particular judge or judges." The district court applies the
doctrine of avoiding constitutional issues when the single judge
decides all nonconstitutional claims before convening the threejudge court. It is true in theory that three judges would be "better" at doing this than the single judge, and that there is therefore
some value in having the three-judge court handle it. But the
statute, as interpreted by Hagans, requires the three-judge court
Supreme Court has decided cases on grounds not relied on by the lower court. Judge
Rosenn further argued that, if it were true that the Supreme Court could not review the
single judge's denial, the same problem, along with the "forced" constitutional decision
by the three-judge court would also arise if the single judge granted the statutory issue
and the Court of Appeals later reversed, since this would have the same result: a threejudge court convened with only the constitutional issue remaining. Thus, the argument
went, the majority's distinction between grants (which Hagans specifically approved) and
denials by the single judge was meaningless. This argument is valid only if the circuit
court would reverse rather than merely vacate an erroneous grant by the single judge. The
majority's language, however, indicates that they would vacate the single judge's grant
and remand so as to give "the tribunal making the final decision an opportunity to reach
a preferred statutory supremacy claim ground." 502 F.2d at 1069. This demonstrates the
inefficiency and the anomaly which inheres in the majority's position, since after a trial
and decision by the single judge, and an appeal and decision by the circuit court on the
merits of the statutory claim, no judgment will have been reached and the parties will
have to relitigate that issue before the three-judge court. If the Third Circuit would in fact
reverse instead of vacating in order to relieve the parties of this burden, then Judge
Rosenn's criticism is valid: the majority's distinction between grants and denials is essentially meaningless since the same problems can arise from a grant as from a denial.
43. 502 F.2d at 1069 (emphasis added).
44. Cf. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970), where the Court speaks of jurisdiction being in the district court "qua court," id. at 402-03, the effect of section 2281 being
merely to place remedial power in certain circumstances only with a three-judge court.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXXIV

only for the constitutional decision. Improvements in other functions of the trial court are clearly not within the purpose of the
statute, which the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated should
be narrowly construed.4 5
Moreover, the hypothetical situation in which the threejudge court is forced to decide the constitutional issue after a
single judge has erroneously denied the plaintiff's statutory claim
is not likely to occur very often. Furthermore given the court's
holding that the single judge's denial is appealable under section
1292(a)(1),11 the plaintiff can obtain a review of that decision in
the court of appeals if he believes it to be erroneous.4 7 As Judge
Rosenn points out in his dissent, the court of appeals may reverse
the denial, and order that the single judge grant the statutory
claim, thus obviating the need for a three-judge court altogether.
If the court of appeals affirms the denial, and remands for a threejudge court to be convened to hear the constitutional issue, it will
have been determined by three circuit judges and a district judge
that the statutory issue is not dispositive. It is difficult to justify
the notion that a three-judge court might reach a "better" result.
In those rare cases in which it would disagree, the fact remains
that it is not the role of the three-judge court to review the circuit
court's decision on the statutory claim or the other aspects of the
trial. That court's only role under Hagans is to decide constitutional issues when called upon to do so. Finally, it is true that the
plaintiff may decide not to appeal, so that the benefit of the
circuit court's holding on the nonconstitutional claim would not
be available. It is likely, however, that the decision not to appeal
would indicate that the statutory claim was not a particularly
strong one. 8
GONZALEZ V. AUTOMATIC EMPLOYEES CREDIT UNION

9

Since Murrow the Supreme Court has addressed another
aspect of the three-judge court procedural maze in Gonzalez v.
45. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Donovan, 398 U.S. 427 (1970); Swift & Co. v. Wickham,
382 U.S. 111 (1965); Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246 (1941).
46. See note 17 supra.
47. While the three-judge court direct appeal procedure was intended as a "better"
and faster procedure for important cases, there is every reason to believe that the usual
appellate route would be preferable, since the Supreme Court tends to dispose of many
direct appeals in summary fashion. See Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union,
95 S. Ct. 289, 295 n.17 (1974).
48. See 502 F.2d at 1072 n.6.
49. 95 S. Ct. 289 (1974).
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Automatic Employees Credit Union. Again, the Court emphasized its desire to limit the application of.the statutory scheme,
this time by narrowing its interpretation of section 1253, which
creates the right of a direct appeal to the Supreme Court from a
three-judge court decision. In Gonzalez, plaintiff sought to enjoin
as unconstitutional the enforcement of various provisions of Illinois' automobile repossession and resale laws.5" The three-judge
court dismissed the action, holding that plaintiff lacked standing
to seek an injunction, since he failed to show that he was threatened by the statutes (his automobile had already been repossessed and sold).51 On appeal by plaintiff, defendant argued that
the Supreme Court should only hear an appeal from a denial of
an injunction by a three-judge court when the denial is based on
the constitutionality of the state law. 2 The Court noted that there
were precedents squarely on point allowing appeal from a denial
of an injunction on grounds short of the constitutional merits.53
It avoided these precedents, however, by stating that:
[Iln the area of statutory three-judge court law the doctrine
of stare decisis has historically been accorded considerably
less than its usual weight. These procedural statutes are very
awkwardly drafted, and in struggling to make workable
sense of them, the Court has not infrequently been induced
to retrace its steps. 4
The Court thus found precedent for discarding precedent. However, the Court found it unnecessary "to explore the full sweep
of [defendant's] argument,"551 merely holding that:
[W]hen a three-judge court denies a plaintiff injunctive
relief on grounds which, if sound, would have justified dissolution of the court as to that plaintiff, or a refusal to request
the convention of a three-judge court [from the beginning],
review of the denial is available only in the Court of Appeals.5
The narrow holding does not affect the availability of a direct
50. Id. at 291.
51. Id. at 292.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 293 n.11, citing among others, Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (lack of
standing); Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972) (lack of subject matter
jurisdiction).
54. Id. at 293 (footnotes omitted).
55. Id. at 295.
56. Id. at 296.
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appeal from a three-judge court decision on a statutory claim. If
the three judges deny the statutory claim, they will also have to
decide the constitutional claim, and appeal from the final decision will be to the Supreme Court. If the three-judge court grants
an injunction on the statutory claim, appeal has also been to the
Supreme Court. s" While Gonzalez does not compel a contrary
result in the latter situation because the holding is limited by its
own terms to denials of injunctions, the direction of the Court's
reasoning is clear, and it is probable that in the future the Court
will require that such appeals be made to the courts of appeals."
In light of the Gonzalez opinion, the Murrow rule appears
contrary to the direction of development in this area. While it is
true that Gonzalez only deals with the direct appeal provision of
the three-judge court procedure, and does not address the question of when such a court should be convened, the purpose of both
is to provide procedural protection against the power of the federal courts to enjoin the enforcement of state statutes on constitutional grounds. 9 Since the tenor of Gonzalez is to limit the threejudge court appellate procedure to questions of constitutional significance, insofar as Murrow expands the requirement for convening a three-judge court beyond such questions, it is inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's strict interpretation of the three-judge
court statutes.
To conclude, the Third Circuit's rule that the single judge
cannot decide statutory claims against the plaintiff is based on a
largely illusory possibility of disagreement among judges, and on
a misconception of the proper application of the doctrine preferring nonconstitutional decisions. As the dissent points out, it also
appears to be irreconcilable with the Hagansrule and the reasoning set forth by the Supreme Court to support it. Furthermore, it
is inconsistent with the Court's concern for limiting its mandatory appellate docket as expressed in Gonzalez. The better procedure would be for the single judge to decide all statutory claims
first, and convene a three-judge court only when no dispositive
grounds remain except the constitutional issue. Clearly, however,
the most appropriate solution would be for Congress to repeal the
57. E.g., Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 382 U.S. 423
(1966).
58. Professor Moore has argued that appeal should not lie to the Supreme Court in
this situation, since the purpose of the direct appeal is to expedite review only where a
state statute has been held unconstitutional. 9 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE
110.03[31,
at 80 (2d ed. 1973).
59. See notes 21-22 and accompanying text supra.

19741

FEDERAL COURTS-THREE JUDGE PANELS

statute, thereby eliminating all of these problems in a single act,
rather than forcing the courts to hash them out piecemeal. Perhaps the Ninety-Fourth Congress will succeed where its
predecessors have not.
[After this note went to press the Supreme Court decided
MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 43 U.S.L.W. 4442 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1975). An
Alabama court had enjoined the operation of the Pussycat Adult
Theatre as a nuisance. Petitioners sought an injunction in the
federal district court on first amendment grounds against enforcement of the state court's preliminary injunction and a declaration that the Alabama nuisance law was unconstitutional. Because of the pendency of the state court proceedings, the threejudge court dismissed the action without prejudice, following the
doctrine laid down in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (federal courts should not enjoin pending state prosecutions begun
prior to the federal complaint except in extraordinary circumstances where necessary to prevent irreparableinjury). The Supreme Court held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over the
case. Following Gonzalez to its logical end, the Court concluded
that:
[A] direct appeal will lie to this Court under § 1253 from
the orderof a three-judge federal court denying interlocutory
or permanent injunctive relief only where such order rests
upon resolution of the merits of the constitutionalclaim presented below.
43 U.S.L.W. at 4443. The Court reserved the question of whether
a single judge can dismiss a complaint on the ground of the "impropriety of federal intervention" without convening a threejudge court. Id. at 4443 n.7. However, this continued narrowing
of the Court's appellatejurisdictionunder § 1253 provides further
support for the conclusion that the Murrow rule, because it expands the requirement for three judges, is incorrect. The concurring opinion of Justice White supports this conclusion more directly:
The more straightforwardapproach to this case would be to
hold that decisions on issues other than requests for injunctive relief challenging the constitutionalityof state statutes
need not be made by three judges but ratherare to be made
by single-judge courts where decisions are appealableonly to
the courts of appeals.
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Id. at 4444 (concurring opinion). This approach to the problem
supports the notion that the requirements for the two halves of
the procedure, i.e., the three-judge court and the direct appeal,
should, to the extent possible, coincide. Where they do not, that
is, where only the three-judge court is required, Justice White
suggests that the three-judge court be "deemed" to have been a
single judge court. Justice White would thus achieve symmetry
between the two halves by use of a fiction.
Justice White also impliedly refuted the Third Circuit'snarrow readingof Hagans (see text accompanying notes 39-40 supra),
by stating that "in /Hagans] we held that even where the statutory claim is joined with a substantial constitutional claim, the
former could be, and should be, decided first by the singlejudge."
Id. at 4444. This statement makes the Murrow distinction between grants and denials of statutory claims difficult to accept.]

